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Abstract 
The Micro Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA) was established by the 
South African government in 2005 to provide production loans to smallholder farmers in all nine 
provinces of South Africa. This study examined the socio-economic and loan factors that 
influence loan repayment of MAFISA-funded farmers in umKanyakude district municipality. 
Using data from 191 selected loans granted by Peulwana Agricultural Financial Services (PAFS), 
the study employed a logit model to identify the explanatory for loan default.  The study found 
that age, gender and education were not significant in determining loan repayment. On the other 
hand, land size, loan cycle and loan amount were significant in influencing loan repayment.  
 
The results of the empirical analysis have three main policy implications for the government and 
the microfinance institutions. Firstly, smallholder farmers should be supported to increase their 
ownership of land size so that they can plant more crops and increase their sales. This will enable 
them to improve their repayment rate. Secondly, smallholder farmers should be provided with 
smaller loan amounts at first as it leads to good repayment. Thirdly microfinance institutions 
should provide more loans to lenders on a second or more cycle as this leads to good repayment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
The Micro Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA) was established by the 
South African government in 2005 to provide production loans to smallholder farmers in all nine 
provinces of South Africa (Gauteng, Western Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, 
Northwest, Northern Cape and Limpopo. The reason for the establishment of the scheme was that 
formal financial institutions like banks did not have appetite to finance smallholder farmers. The 
reasons for lack of appetite include high transaction costs, high risk, lack of collateral, unstable 
income, lower literacy levels and high monitoring costs (Nawai, 2010). The scheme was 
established from a once-off allocation of R1billion from the government of South Africa and was 
expected to sustain itself through interest earned from funds in the bank, interest earned from 
recovered loans, and loan repayments from smallholder farmers. The government was not directly 
involved in providing loans. They appointed nine retail intermediaries who provided loans 
directly to the smallholder farmers. The loans offered to smallholder farmers range from R10 000 
to R500 000. The loans cover production inputs and small equipment. The initial maximum 
amount was R100 000 and was increased to R500 000 in 2015 (Mafisa 2015). From inception to 
31 March 2018 a total amount of R415 million has been disbursed to smallholder farmers (Mafisa  
2018). Of the R415 million disbursed R215 million has been repaid, which is a 50% repayment 
rate. (Mafisa  2014). However, the repayment rate in KwaZulu-Natal has been far better than the 
national figure as it has ranged from 65% in 2010 to 94% in 2018.The reason for the variance is 
that most of the funded farmers in KwaZulu-Natal farm sugar cane, which is a tight value chain 
with no opportunity for side-selling. The intermediaries also take cessions from millers in the 
area, which helps to improve the repayment rate.  
Initially MAFISA funds were made available to intermediaries at 1% interest and intermediaries 
were to retail the loans at 8% to smallholder farmers.. The 1% is added back to the fund while the 
7% is retained by the intermediaries as service fee. However, with the pressure to make loans 
affordable to the producers, the funds were given to intermediaries at zero interest and the 
intermediaries are to retail the loans at 7% interest rate.  From 2015 intermediaries receive 8% of 
the loan value as their repayment. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Prior to 1994 South Africa relied on the Land Bank and the Agriculture Credit Board to provide 
financial support to farmers. After 1994 the Strauss commission recommended that the ACB 
board be dissolved.This commission recommended the establishment of the Comprehensive 
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Support Programme (CASP) in order to cater for  the financial , infrastructure , marketing and 
extension needs of smallholder farmers who could not access these services  from the formal 
financial institutions because they could not qualify as they are perceived to be very risky. 
Mafisa was established as a pillar that would provide the financial needs of smallholder farmers. 
Although Daff was not directly involved in the assessment of clients and the disbursement of 
funds to the smallholder farmers it was marketed as a government scheme .As a result the farmers 
are aware that the funds come from government. 
Besides Mafisa loans government also provided grants to smallholder farmers . Those farmers 
who receive grants do not have to repay anything to the government. As a result the  Mafisa 
scheme experience ‘strategic defaults’”where those farmers who are able to pay decide not to pay 
as they argue that it is  government money and that some smallholder farmers receive grant which 
they are non supposed to repay.   
Mafisa has a total loan book of R400 million. As of 31 March 2018, the repayment rate was 50% 
(Mafisa 2018). The scheme is a revolving fund and if repayments are low it implies that other 
farmers will not be able to get loans in the future. Low repayments may also lead to the closure 
of the scheme as funds can dry up. If that happens, government will no longer be able to assist 
smallholder farmers with credit for production inputs and this will hamper its initiative to create 
jobs, revitalise rural areas and provide food security. On the other hand, smallholder farmers and 
intermediaries may lose their source of livelihoods. 
According to Nanayakkara and Stewart 2015 : 322) 
“the success of microfinance institutions to alleviate poverty depends on their 
repayment performance, because a high repayment rate indicates that the majority 
of clients have invested in useful assets that generate income sufficient for 
themselves, as well as to enable them to make repayments. In addition, it also 
improves the sustainability of the MFI; enabling it to reduce interest rates or offer 
services to more poor borrowers. Lastly, a loan portfolio with a high repayment rate 
attracts additional external funding.”   
1.3 Research questions and objectives  
The research will answer the following questions:  
(a) What is the rate of loan repayments of Mafisa-funded farmers in uMkanyakude, 
KwaZulu-Natal? 
(b) What are the socio-economic and loan factors that affect Mafisa loan repayments in 
uMkanyakude, KwaZulu-Natal province?  
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The general objective of this study is to determine factors that influence Mafisa loan repayments 
in uMkanyakude, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). From the above research questions, the objectives 
are;  
(a) To examine the loan repayment rate among Mafisa-funded farmers in KZN. 
(b) To examine the effect of age, gender, education, loan amount, loan cycle and number 
of hectares on loan repayments of Mafisa-funded farmers in KZN. 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
The study will test the following six null hypotheses: 
𝐻1Age does not have any significant effect on Mafisa loan repayments. 
𝐻2 Gender does not have any significant effect on Mafisa loan repayments. 
𝐻3 Education does not have any significant effect on Mafisa loan repayments. 
𝐻4   Loan amount does not have any significant effect on Mafisa loan repayments 
H5 Loan cycle does not have any significant effect on Mafisa loan repayments.  
H6 Land size does not have any significant effect on Mafisa loan repayments.  
1.5 Justification of the research  
Baklouiti (2013) pointed out that loan repayment for microfinance institutions is an important 
field of study. This is due to the fact that microfinance institutions lend to the poor, which requires 
that terms of lending should be made easy in order to increase access. This poses challenges for 
lenders as the borrowers are riskier because they do not have collateral. 
According to Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015:322)  
“the success of MFIs in their effort to alleviate poverty depends on their 
repayment performance. In the first place, a high repayment rate is a sign that 
borrowers have invested in useful assets that generate incomes sufficient for 
themselves as well as enabling repayments. Furthermore, a high repayment 
rate increases the sustainability of the MFI and also enables it to reduce 
interest rates or offer additional services to borrowers. Thirdly, loan 
portfolios with high repayment rates attract more funding.  The fact that there 
are millions of dollars that are invested in microfinance every year makes 
research into factors that affect repayment for MFIS interesting and 
important.”  
Government may use the research to improve policies when they design loan schemes and lenders 
may use the results of the study to improve the repayment rates of their loan schemes, which is 
important for sustainability. If the loan scheme targets smallholder farmers with the correct 
4 
 
attributes, its sustainability will be improved, and this implies that government will not be 
required to provide additional, scarce resources. On the other hand, intermediaries will continue 
to operate their enterprises and smallholder farmers will benefit from sustainable and targeted 
financial support informed by empirical evidence. Beneficiaries will benefit from government 
policies that are informed by farmers’ needs. Researchers may use it to identify gaps that may 
assist them to conduct future research studies in the same area. 
There are very few studies that have been conducted on the determinants of loan repayments in 
South Africa. As a result, there is a need to determine if findings from other countries also apply 
to South Africa.  
1.6. Limitations of the research  
The research has only been conducted in the district municipality of uMkanyakude, KZN province 
on Mafisa-funded farmers by Peulwana Financial Services. Based on that, the results do not apply 
to all 44 district municipalities in South Africa. This was based on cost and time considerations. 
Some information on the age of the farmers was missing on the list provided and this may have 
an impact on the findings. This study did not cover the following variables which may also affect 
loan repayments : “availability of collateral and guarantees; transport availability in the area; 
whether the borrower is a group or individual; purpose for which the loan is used; time to approve 
and disburse the loan; visiting frequency by loan officers; whether training is provided to the 
borrowers; and, the attitude of borrowers to loan repayment”, Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015). 
These variables were not considered because time and financial resources for this study were 
limited.  
1.7 Organisation of the study. 
The dissertation consists of five chapters which have been organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 provides the history of microfinance, models of microfinance, overview of 
farming in KZN, the theoretical framework of loan repayment and empirical literature 
review.  
 Chapter 3 covers the research methodology under the following sub headings: sample 
size, analytical framework and the estimation technique. 
 Chapter 4 presents the research findings, covers descriptive statistics, chi square test 
and the logit regression analysis.  
 Chapter 5 provides a summary of the study, conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will define terms and concepts that are relevant for microfinance; it will also cover 
characteristics of microfinance, the history of microfinance, models of microfinance as well as 
causes of loan default. After that it will provide an overview of Mafisa funding, the theoretical 
framework for loan repayment and the empirical literature review. It will conclude with a 
summary. 
2.2 Definition of terms and concepts 
2.2.1 Microfinance and Microcredit 
Robinson (2001,p.59) defined microfinance as “small-scale financial services, primarily credit 
and savings provided to people who farm or fish or herd, who operate small enterprises or 
microenterprises where goods are produced, or recycled, repaired or sold, who provide services, 
who work for wages or commission, who gain income from renting out small amounts of land, 
vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and tools, and other individuals and groups at the local levels 
of developing countries, both rural and urban. Many such households have multiple sources of 
income.” 
Abor (2017,p.116 defined microcredit as the provision of micro loans to those with low incomes 
and households with little or no collateral. These borrowers have a challenge in accessing credit 
or loans from the traditional or formal financial institutions. Microfinance is a broad term that 
covers microcredit, micro-insurance and savings. Microcredit is the lending arm of microfinance. 
Based on the definitions provided above, microfinance involves the provision of small loans, 
insurance, and savings mobilisation to small and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) 
2.2.2. Rural finance 
Robinson, (2001,p.10 defined rural finance as 
 “financial services that are used in the rural areas by people of all income groups’’ 
2.2.3 Delinquent loan and loan default 
Delinquent loan refers to a loan that a lender has written off Norell 2001, p. 116) and loan default 
happens when the borrower has failed to meet his or her legal obligations according to the debt 
agreement, or fails to repay the loan (Addae-Korankye 2014)   
2.3 History of microfinance 
Rahman (2010,p.6 provided the history of microfinance based on the following ten stages: 
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“The stages were grouped as follows: the beginning of time, the middle ages, the 
1700s, the 1800s, 1950 to 1970, the 1980s, the early 1990s, and the millennium 
(current period). Since the beginning of time informal savings and credit groups 
have operated for centuries across the developed world. During the middle ages an 
Italian monk created the first official pawn shop in 1462. In 1515, pawnshops were 
empowered to charge interest so that they could cover their operating costs.” 
According to Rahman (2010,p.7)  
“Jonathan Swift started the Irish Loan Fund system in the 1700s, which provided 
micro loans to poor farmers who had no collateral (security). In the mid-1800s 
Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen and his supporters developed the concept of the 
financial cooperative in Germany. This movement later expanded into other 
continents (Europe, North America and developing countries). During the period 
1950 to 1970 development finance institutions were used to disburse concessional 
loans and on-lend to customers at below market rates. These DFIs lost money as the 
subsidized lending rates could not cover their operating costs.” 
“In the early 1970s loans were extended to groups of poor women to invest in micro-
enterprises. Examples are Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and Accion International, 
which was started in Latin America. In the 1980s microcredit programs improved 
on their methodologies. They charged cost recovery interest rates and achieved high 
repayment rates. This enabled them to achieve long-term sustainability and to reach 
a large number of clients. In the early 1990s microcredit was replaced by 
microfinance, which includes savings, insurance and money transfers. In the 
millennium, the borders between traditional microfinance and the larger financial 
system started to blur. Banks and other players in other countries entered the 
microfinance space”.   
2.4  Models of Microfinance  
According to Murray and Boros (2002) the majority of micro financial institutions use the group 
lending model. Other models that are utilised are the following: Individual lending, credit unions 
village banking and self-help groups. Abor (2017) also identified similar models of microfinance. 
2.4.1 Group lending 
In this model the financial institution grants loans to group members instead of an individual. The 
group assumes joint responsibility for a loan repayment. The group members exert peer pressure 
on each other to ensure repayment and, in case of default, the whole group is liable for repayment. 
The best-known example of this model is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Abor 2017) 
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2.4.2 Individual lending 
The financial institution lends money to an individual who assumes responsibility for a loan 
repayment. The responsibility to repay the loan rests with the individual and not the group. 
2.4.3 Credit unions 
These are organisations that are based in the local communities and collect savings and provide 
short-term credit (Murray and Boros 2002) Loans are based on the savings and, as a result, the 
demand for loans always exceeds supply. 
2.4.4 Self-help groups 
Most of these associations are formed by women. Members save an agreed amount on a monthly 
basis and this money is saved in a common pool. Members are allowed to borrow from the 
common pool, but they should repay that capital with interest. In South Africa, an example is the 
Stokvel. In other parts of the world, these groups are known by different names: e.g., Tontines in 
west Africa. The Grameen Bank succeeded in improving women’s economic status and also 
empowered them. Women were enabled to contribute income to the family and that helped to 
improve their self-worth (Mokhtar, 2011). 
2.5 Characteristics of microfinance 
Murray and Boros (2002) identified the following characteristics of microfinance. Firstly, the 
amounts of loans and or savings are small. In addition, microfinance provides short-term loans 
and payment schedules are structured in the form of frequent instalments (or frequent deposits). 
Repayments are comprised of interest and the capital amount. Interest rates are high compared to 
commercial banks and it is relatively easy to access a microfinance institution. Microfinance 
makes use of simple application forms that are easy to complete, and they also process application 
forms in shorter periods compared to commercial lenders. Repeat clients who pay on time are 
offered higher amounts of credit and lastly, microfinance does not require collateral, contrary to 
formal lending institutions. 
2.6 Overview of farming and Mafisa in KwaZulu-Natal 
2.6.1  Overview of farming in KwaZulu-Natal 
KwaZulu-Natal has a larger area of high-quality agricultural land compared to other provinces in 
South Africa. It also ranks first on several agricultural products. A significant percentage of South 
African small-scale farmers are based in KwaZulu-Natal (17%). According to Kzn topbusiness 
(2018) “thehe high-quality agricultural area is found between Pietermaritzburg and the 
Drakensberg. Another area with high quality agricultural land is the North coast region. The 
province has a total of 6,5 million hectares of land of which 82% is suitable for livestock farming 
and 18% is arable land.” 
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The agricultural sector is mainly focused on the following crops: sugar cane, Maize, subtropical 
fruits, cashew nuts, bananas, potatoes, vegetables and forestry. The province is also well-known 
for animal husbandry (beef, sheep, poultry and pig farming). Dairy farming is also an important 
sector in KwaZulu-Natal. Dairy farming is found in areas around Richards Bay, Empangeni, 
Durban and Pietermaritzburg. It is also found in inland areas ranging from Ulundi, Vryheid, 
Newcastle, Ladysmith and Estcourt. The Highveld and the midlands areas are the main beef 
production areas. Sheep farming is mainly found along the Drakensberg, Vryheid and Southern 
Natal. 
“The largest chicken producer - Rainbow - is located in Westville, KwaZulu-Natal. It employs 
more than 7000 people in its agricultural, feed milling, processing and service facilities. The two 
largest forest companies (Sappi and Mondi) are found in KwaZulu-Natal. Timber accounts for 
6,5% of Kwazulu-Natal’s agricultural output. KwaZulu-Natal is the heart of the sugar industry in 
South Africa and contributes between 0,5% and 0,7% of the national gross domestic product. The 
most important agricultural land for sugar cane lies alongside the KwaZulu-Natal south coast. 
The Hluhluwe region of KwaZulu-Natal produces more than 90% of South Africa queen 
pineapples, which are exported to Europe”, Kzn topbusiness (2018)  
2.6.2 Overview of Mafisa funding in KwaZulu-Natal  
Mafisi operates in KwaZulu-Natal alongside the Land Bank and Ithala bank. However, 
smallholder farmers prefer Mafisa because of the shorter time it takes to finalise an application. 
Most of the smallholder farmers need funding for production inputs. The two banks also require 
collateral from smallholder farmers who are unable to provide it.   
In KwaZulu-Natal MAFISA operates through three (3) institutions and these are the South 
African Sugar Association (SASA), Peulwana Agricultural Financial Services (PAFS) and the 
National Emerging Red Meat Producers Organisation (NERPO). SASA is based in KwaZulu-
Natal and provides funding to sugar cane farmers. NERPO is a livestock commodity organization 
that focuses on support to livestock farmers in all provinces of South Africa including KwaZulu-
Natal.   
PAFS is a private organization proving funding to agricultural enterprises. PAFS provides 
funding to various agricultural enterprises such as horticulture, grains, vegetables, sugar cane and 
poultry. PAFS has also funded agro-processing activities. PAFS is the only Mafisa intermediary 
that operates in Ilembe and uMkanyakude district municipalities. Table 2.1 below provides a 
summary of Mafisa repayments in KwaZulu-Natal from 2007/8 to 2017/18. 
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Table 1: PAFS loan repayments 
Year 
Disbursed 
(R million) 
Repaid (R 
million) 
Beneficiaries Jobs 
Repayment as 
% of 
disbursements 
2008/9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
2009/10 R 7.98 0.00 330 0.00 0 
2010/11 R 9.84 R 6.45 472 951 65 
2011/12 R 7.06 R 6.40 544 2701 90 
2012/13 8.01 R 5.60 690 1280 69 
2013/14 R 13.84 R 6.56 1576 381 47 
2014/15 R7.38 R 6.63 798 101 89 
2015/16 R 8.35 R 6.05 690 262 72 
2016/17 R 11.33 R 7.05 269 1347 61 
2017/18 R 9.36 R 8.63 207 1647 92 
Total R 56.24 R 53.37 1080 8670 94 
Source: Daff (2018) 
PAFS started disbursing Mafisa loans in KwaZulu-Natal in the 2009/10 financial year. During 
that year no repayments were made because farmers are provided with an opportunity to harvest 
before they are expected to make loan repayments. In 2011 the repayment rate was 65% and this 
improved to 90% in 2012. The reason for the improvement in the repayment rate is that PAFS 
took cessions on the loans. However, the repayment rate deteriorated to in 2013 and 2014 as a 
result of drought. Many farmers lost their crops and, as a result, they could not make repayments 
on their loans. Nevertheless, the repayment rate improved in 2015 followed by a decline in 2016 
and 2017. In 2018 the repayment rate improved to 94%.     
2.7 Theoretical framework of loan repayment 
2.7.1 Theory of rural credit market 
The loan repayment of smallholder farmers is based on the theory of the rural credit market. 
“Hoff and Stiglitz (1996) explained the rural credit market in terms of three theories.These  are 
the traditional monolopy theory, perfect market theory and the imperfect market theory.The 
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traditional monopoly theory states that moneylenders found in the informal market charge 
exorbitant interest rates so that they can maximize their profit because they are monopolists with 
no competitors.However this theory does not explain why the formal and informal market exist 
side by side despite the fact that interest rate charged in the formal market is lower than that 
charged in the informal market. 
The perfect market theory states that the rural credit market is perfectly competitive and has a 
market clearing equilibrium. Furthermore it argues that high interest rates charged by the lender 
are a reflection of the high risk of borrowers. (Chisasa2014,p100). There is lack of empirical 
evidence to support this theory due the fact that credit rationing is observed in the market. Credit 
rationing refers to a situation where a lender denies credit to prospective borrowers due to 
asymmetric information and moral hazard and not because funds are not available (Robinson, 
2001). Asymmetric information occurs when it is difficult or uneconomical for the lender to 
obtain information about the credit-worthiness of the borrower (Nanayakkara & Stewart, 2015). 
Moral hazard refers to a situation where borrowers do not attempt to use the loan in a productive 
manner or use it for some other purpose (Nanayakkara & Stewart, 2015). Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) indicated that identical loan applicants will not all succeed to get a loan even though they 
may be prepared to pay a high interest rate. 
 
The imperfect market theory states that the informal credit  market is associated with the following 
characteristics:uncertainty,high transaction costs and information asymmetry.These 
characteristics result in moral hazard and adverse selection. Asymmetric information occurs when 
it is difficult or uneconomical for the lender to obtain information about the credit-worthiness of 
the borrower (Nanayakkara & Stewart, 2015). Moral hazard refers to a situation where borrowers 
do not attempt to use the loan in a productive manner or use it for some other purpose 
(Nanayakkara & Stewart, 2015). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) indicated that identical loan applicants 
will not all succeed to get a loan even though they may be prepared to pay a high interest rate. 
Hoff and Stiglitz, (1996) based their theory on the screening, incentive and enforcement problems. 
The screening problem arises due to the likelihood that borrowers will default, and lenders incur 
high cost, to determine the risk of each borrower. The incentive problem is explained as the high 
cost incurred by the lender to ensure that borrowers take those actions that make repayment likely. 
The fact that it is difficult to force borrowers to repay the loan is referred to as the enforcement 
problem. Nawai and Shariff (2010) added the agency problem as “one of the challenges that 
lenders face in the market”. 
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In support of Hoff and Stiglitz (1996), Robinson (2001) identified the following key concepts 
regarding the imperfect information paradigm. The concepts are asymmetric information, adverse 
selection, moral hazard and credit rationing. In addition, Rao (2003) also identified asymmetric 
information and transaction costs as contributing factors for the imperfect market.  Adverse 
selection and moral hazard contribute to the increased occurrence of default in a lenders loan 
portfolio (Robinson ,2001). 
 
2.8 Determinants of loan repayment 
Norell (2001) identified the following contributing factors to loan repayment. In the first place, 
borrowers may want to test the lenders’ seriousness about collecting loan repayments. Secondly, 
there are times when clients experience unforeseen crises such as illness or death in the family. 
They may feel compelled to provide financial assistance even from borrowed funds. Thirdly, 
some borrowers may use the loan or part of the loan for personal use with the result that loan 
repayment will decapitalise the business. Lastly some loans are granted on the basis of favouritism 
and as a result, a borrower may attempt to delay the payment and default hoping that the loan will 
be written off. 
According to Norrell (2001) the lender may implement the following actions to reduce loan 
arrears: quick “follow-up of late loans; forming strong solidary groups; update and enforce credit 
policies; credit officers may focus on a specific geographic area; not lending to new start-up 
businesses; and, providing incentives to finance officers” . If a credit officer visits the client 
regarding missed payment on the first day after the missed payment the client may receive him 
warmly and he can warn of bad consequences of defaulting on the loan repayment such as legal 
action. 
Regarding group loans, it is important to visit the home of the chairperson regularly. This is so 
because in most cases it is the chairperson who misuses the money. The chairperson should be 
made aware that if there are areas on the loan account the first stop of the loan officer will be the 
chairperson’s home or business. During the formation and training stages group members should 
understand their roles clearly and also grasp that they are individual signatories for their loans. 
This allows the credit officer to notice visible signs of development in the neighbourhood arising 
from the borrower’s income (e.g. greater economic activity) or higher attendance at school by 
children. Conversely, if the credit officers’ areas are spread over a big area the multiplier effect 
of their incomes will be diluted. 
The lender may only fund enterprises with at least 12 months experience. Most start-ups usually 
fail within the first year of operation. As a result, funding a business with more than a year of 
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operation reduces the risk. The lender may implement an incentive system for loan officers in 
which they receive bonuses depending on the performance of their loan portfolios. 
For those loans that are late (60 days without payment) the lender may group them into the 
following four categories and design a repayment strategy for each group (Norell, 2001):  
(a) Willing and able to repay. 
(b) Willing but not able to repay. 
(c)  Unwilling but able to repay, and  
(e) Unwilling and unable to repay   
 Table 2: Repayment strategy per borrower type  
Groups Strategy 
Willing and able to repay.  The lender can be allowed to make partial payment on 
the loan. 
Willing but not able to 
repay 
The loan can be restructured, and the client should sign a 
new loan agreement. The partial interest due and the 
penalty are added on a new loan. 
Unwilling but able to repay Legal action can be perused, or the community can be 
informed of the lenders unwillingness to repay. Lenders 
may also be handed over to the debt collector. 
Unwilling and unable to 
repay  
Those loans should be referred to debt collectors or be 
written off as it is not productive to use the lender’s staff 
and time on this group. 
 Source: Norell (2001) 
2.9 Empirical literature review 
According to Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015) and Roslan and Karim (2009) the empirical 
evidence can be divided into three themes which are: borrower characteristics, lender or 
institutional characteristics, and loan characteristics. Other themes are economic (Isitor,Otunaiya, 
Adeyonu & Fabiyi, 2016) and natural calamities (Selassie 2008).  On the other hand, Isitor et al. 
(2016) divided the empirical evidence into the following themes: socio economic characteristics, 
business characteristics and loan characteristics. This approach will be followed in this paper. 
2.9.1 Socio economic characteristics 
Sharma and Zeller (1997, p.131) analysed repayments of 128 groups in Bangladesh utilizing the 
Tobit model to determine factors that affected the repayments rate of three groups. The study 
found that group-based institutions with higher levels of social cohesion have better repayment 
rates than individual lending.  
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Similarly, a study done by Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015) analysed data on 1109 records from 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka using logistic regression and concluded that group lending is less risky 
than individual lending. Similar results were obtained by Reta (2011), Assefa (2002) and Che 
(2002). 
Brehanu and Fufa (2008) used the two–limit Tobit model to analyse the determinants of loan 
repayments rate from semi-formal financial institutions among small scale farmers in Ethiopia. 
The results showed that small group lending had a significant and positive relationship with the 
repayment rate. 
This is because the functions of screening, monitoring and enforcement are transferred to group 
members (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990) in-group lending whereas the lender has to perform all these 
functions in individual lending. Peer pressure also leads to fewer moral hazards which results in 
improved repayments. 
On the other hand, Godquin (2004) investigated group repayments in Bangladesh and discovered 
that social ties among the group (proxied by the age of the group) had a significant negative impact 
on the repayment rate. This is in contrast to research done by Sharma and Zeller (1997) and 
Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015). The explanation for this different finding is that perhaps the 
power of social penalties decreases as the time of social ties increases as members of the group 
get to know each other better. 
Isitor et al. (2016) investigated factors that are crucial in improving smallholder cooperative 
farmers’ loan repayment in Remo Division of Ogun state, Nigeria using the probit regression 
analysis. The results indicated that age, level of education and farming experience, were the major 
factors that increase the likelihood of loan repayment. The number of family members was 
inversely related to the probability of repayment. 
Similarly, Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008) examined socio-economic factors that influence loan 
repayment among small scale farmers in Ogbomoso Agricultural Zone of Oyo state, Nigeria. The 
study showed that the level of education is one of the major factors that positively and 
significantly influenced loan repayment. On the other hand, the age of the farmer influenced loan 
repayments negatively. 
Mokhtar (2011) used logistic regression to determine factors that affect loan repayment in Tekum 
and Yum, Malaysia. The study found that older borrowers in the age group 46 to 55 years in 
Tekum had significant loan repayment problems. However, in Yum younger borrowers in the age 
group 18 to 25 had significant loan repayment problems. 
Roslan and Karim (2009) investigated the determinants of loan repayment among microcredit 
borrowers of Agrobank in Malaysia. They used the probit and logit models to identify the main 
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determinants that influence the probability of loan repayment. The results of the study showed 
that the gender of the borrower influenced the probability of loan repayment. Other studies that 
support this are Oladele and Ward (2016) and Nam and Duy (2016)  
Wamalwa (2016) conducted a study with the objective of identifying the determinants of loan 
repayment by borrowers in microfinance institutions in Nakuru county, Kenya. The study used 
the linear multi-regression model and the results showed that education level, income level and 
age have a negative impact on loan repayment. Negera (2014) assessed the socio-economic and 
demographic factors that influence loan repayment. The results indicated that non-farm income 
had a positive and significant effect on loan repayment performance. On the other hand, family 
size and celebration of social ceremonies had a negative impact on loan repayment. 
Kiliswa and Bayat (2014) identified the major determinants of loan repayment in small-scale 
enterprises in Kariobangi Division Nairobi, Kenya. They found that personal characteristics such 
as education level, family size, and business experience of respondents have a positive 
relationship to loan repayment. Furthermore, they also found out that age and gender had an 
inverse relationship to loan repayment. 
Reta (2011) analysed and identified the factors that influence the loan repayment performance of 
the beneficiaries of ADCSI. They found that age was a factor that influenced loan repayments. 
Gender was found to be a significant determinant of loan repayment.  
Bhatt and Tang (2002) analysed the determinants of loan repayments for four microcredit 
programmes in the US. The results showed that higher levels of education increases the 
borrower’s chance of loan repayment. Selassie, (2008) identified the major socio-economic 
factors that affect the loan repayment capacity of members of multipurpose cooperatives of 
Kilteawulalo in Ethiopia. The study found that education status, experience in credit utilization, 
off-farm and non-farm activity of the household, were positively related to loan repayment. 
Oladele and Ward (2016) examined the determinants of loan repayment patterns for Micro 
Agricultural Financial Institution of South Africa in the Northwest province. Significant 
determinants of no repayment were natural capital, gender, marital status and membership of 
organisations. Significant determinants of repayment were human capital, marital status, 
dependents and gender.  
Mashatola and Darroch (2003) investigated factors that affect loan repayment on a mortgage loan 
scheme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa using a logit model. The results showed that farmers 
with higher levels of average annual farm gross turnover relative to loan size and those with access 
to off-farm income had a high repayment rate. 
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Kuhn and Darroch (1999) did a study on the rural medium-term loan performance in KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa and found that first time borrowers and clients with modest loans and small 
owner direct equity tended to default on loan repayments. 
Baklouti (2013) used the logistic regression to identify the determinants of microcredit loan 
repayments for the Tunisian Microfinance Bank. The results highlighted that educational level, 
borrower’s age, marital status and gender have a noticeable effect on the repayment strategy. 
Njoku and Odii (1991) analysed the loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers in 
Nigeria. The study found that a positive relationship between farming and years of farming 
experience and loan repayment. Loan repayment also improved with the size of the farm. 
Nwachuku (2013) undertook a study to identify the major characteristics of borrowers who fail 
to honour their repayment commitments as opposed to those who partially repaid their loans. The 
study found that older borrowers were more likely to have repayment problems. The frequency 
visits by extension officers reduced the chances of default.   
Nam and Duy (2016) found that repayment in-group schemes was positively affected by 
educational level, and negatively by the loan amount and repayment by independent borrowers is 
positively affected by the loan amount, farmers as borrowers and gender of borrowers. add 
background 
Haile (2015) found that the probability of loan default increased as the family size increase, when 
the borrowers has a negative perception on repayment period, less training, low business 
experience, poor saving habit and only has a single source of income. Isitor et al (2016) and Nam 
and Duy (2016) found a positive relationship between loan repayment and age of the borrower. 
However, Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008), Wamalwa (2016) and Kiliswa and Bayat (2014) 
reported a negative relationship between loan repayment and age. 
In their studies Isitor, Otunaiya and Fabiyi (2016) and Nam and Duy (2016), Oladeebo and 
Oladeebo (2008), Kiliswa and Bayat (2014) and Selasie, (2008) found a positive relationship 
between loan repayment and education. On the other hand, Wamalwa (2016) reported a negative 
relationship between loan repayment and education. 
Another study with different results is on family size. Negera (2014) found a positive relationship 
between loan repayment and family size. On the contrary, Kiliswa and Bayat (2014) and Selasie 
(2008) reported a negative relationship between loan repayment and family size.  
2.9.2. Lender characteristics or institutional factors 
According to Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015) 
 “this covers time to approve and disburse the loan amount approved compared to 
amount applied, period for which the loan is approved compared to the period 
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applied, visiting frequency by the loan officers, whether training is provided to the 
borrowers and whether consultancy services are provided to the borrowers.” 
Roslan and Karim (2009) investigated the determinants of loan repayment among microcredit 
borrowers of Agrobank in Malaysia. They used the probit and logit models to identify the main 
determinants that influence the probability of loan repayment. The results of the study showed 
that training and advice by the same organisation positively influence the probability of loan 
repayment. Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015) found that rising frequency of the loan officer were 
found to be significant when predicting loan repayment in Sri Lanka. 
Onyeagocha, Chidebula, et al (2012) analysed the loan repayment performance of microfinance 
institutions in the South-East state of Nigeria. Outreach, training duration and credit officers’ 
experience were found to be determinants of loan repayment performance. 
Negera (2014) assessed the institutional factors that affect rural loan repayment performance of 
smallholder farmers. The results indicated that extension contact had a positive impact on loan 
repayment. On the other hand, distance from the main road had a significant effect on loan 
repayment. Oladele and Ward (2016) examined the determinants of loan repayment patterns for 
Micro Agricultural Financial Institution of South Africa in the Northwest province and discovered 
that the frequency of extension contact has a positive influence on loan repayment. 
Nwachuku (2013) undertook a study to identify the major characteristics of borrowers who fail 
to honour their repayment commitments as opposed to those who partially repaid their loans. The 
frequency visits by extension officers reduced the chances of default.  Batt and Tang (2002) 
analysed the determinants of loan repayments for four microcredit programmes in the US. The 
results showed that higher levels of education increases the borrower’s chance of loan repayment. 
Haile (2015) found that the probability of loan default increased when the borrower has a negative 
perception on the loan repayment period and has less training.  
Nanayakkara (2015) did a study on loan repayments using logit and found that the loan cycle was 
significant to predict loan repayment. This is because those who have a good repayment record 
on their first loans get bigger loans in their next loan applications. 
Selassie (2008) used the logit model to determine factors that influence loan repayment. The 
findings were that the amount of the loan had a positive significant influence on loan repayment. 
The reason for this is that as the loan amount increases, it enables the borrower to generate more 
farm income as it creates access for the household to use the required amount of inputs.  
2.9.3.  Loan characteristics  
Roslan and Karim (2009) investigated the determinants of loan repayment among microcredit 
borrowers of Agrobank in Malaysia. They used the probit and logit models to identify the main 
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determinants that influence the probability of loan repayment. The results of the study showed 
that the amount of the loan and repayment period influence the probability of loan repayment. 
Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008) examined loan factors that influence loan repayment among 
small-scale farmers in Ogbomoso Agricultural Zone of Oyo state, Nigeria. The study showed that 
the amount of loan obtained by farmers was a major factor that positively and significantly 
influenced loan repayment. 
Baklouiti (2013) used the logistic regression to identify the determinants of microcredit loan 
repayments for the Tunisian Microfinance Bank. The results highlighted that the credit amount 
has a noticeable effect on the repayment strategy. Kiliswa and Bayat (2014) investigated the major 
determinants of loan repayment in small-scale enterprises in Kariobangi Division, Nairobi, 
Kenya. They found that the amount of loan applied has a positive relationship to loan repayment. 
Furthermore, they also found out that the interest rate had an inverse relationship to loan 
repayment. 
Onyeagocha, Chidebula, et al (2012) analysed loan factors that affect repayment rate of 
microfinance institutions in the South-East states of Nigeria.  Loan size was found to be a 
determinant of loan repayment performance. Selassie, (2008) identified the loan factors that affect 
loan repayment of capacity of members of multipurpose cooperatives of Kilteawulalo in Ethiopia. 
The study found that the appropriateness of the repayment period was significant at less than 5 
percent. Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015) analysed data relating to 1109 loan records from 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka and developed models to predict the repayment probability of micro 
financing loans using logistics regression. The study the found that time to approve and disburse 
the loan, loan cycle and the purpose of the loan and rising frequency of the loan officer were 
found to be significant when predicting loan repayment in Sri Lanka. In Indonesia three factors 
were significant. The factors are time to approve and disburse the loan and the interest payment 
frequency. 
Mokhtar (2011) in a study performed in Malaysia, found that farmers who paid weekly loan 
repayments in Tekum and Yum borrowers who paid more than Rm201 a week loan repayment 
encountered problems in repaying their loans. Godquin (2004) examined the microfinance 
repayment performance in Bangladesh and found that the size of the loan had a negative impact 
on loan repayment. Nam and Duy (2016) found that repayment in-group schemes was negatively 
affected by the loan amount and repayment by independent borrowers is positively affected by 
the loan amount. 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter opened with tracing the history of microfinance from its beginning until the current 
period. It also covered microfinance models, characteristics of microfinance and an overview of 
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farming and Mafisa in Kwazulu-Natal. After that it covered the theoretical framework of loan 
repayment, causes of loan non-repayment and strategies for addressing different types of 
borrowers. 
According to Hoff and Stiglitz (1996),   
“loan repayment is based on the theory of the rural credit market which states that 
the informal credit market is characterised by uncertainty, high transaction costs 
and information asymmetry that leads to moral hazard and adverse selection. As a 
result of the lender is faced with the problems of screening, incentive and 
enforcement.” 
The empirical literature review was organised into socio-economic, lender and loan 
characteristics. The studies identified different findings between loan repayment, age and 
education. On the other hand, there were similar findings on loan repayment and lender and loan 
characteristics. Clarification is needed. 
This study is aimed at determining socio-economic and loan factors that influence loan repayment 
of Mafisa-funded farmers in uMkhanyakude district municipality. The factors that will be 
investigated are age, level of education, gender, loan cycle and the number of hectares. There is 
no similar research that has been undertaken for the identified district municipality and, as a result, 
it will be useful to determine if the results found in other countries apply to this district as well. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the research methodology and data. Section 3.2 and 3.3 will cover the sample 
size including data and the analytical framework respectively. The analytical framework discusses 
the description and specification of the regression equation as well as the definition and 
measurement of variables in the regression model. Section 3.4 discusses the estimation technique. 
3.2 Data and sample size 
The unit of analysis is Mafisa-funded farmers in Ilembe and Umkhanyekude district 
municipalities. The study uses secondary data obtained from a Mafisa intermediary (Peulwana 
Agricultural Financial Services). The data collected include the following variables on 
smallholder farmers: age, gender, level of education and loan status. This data will be 
supplemented with data available from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
which will provide the age of the farmer and the number of hectares of each farmer.  The data 
covers the period 2010 to 2017 on Mafisa-funded farmers in uMkanyakude, KwaZulu-Natal. 
The first step in the determining of an appropriate sample included the definition of research 
population. This study population was identified as “all beneficiaries (farmers) of Mafisa loan 
schemes throughout the nine provinces of South Africa who are currently in the Mafisa loan 
book”. Due to the time and budget constraints, a sampling technique was used to represent the 
population. A stratified random sampling framework was therefore chosen. Using this technique, 
farmers were grouped into distinct strata by provinces and districts. One province (KwaZulu-
Natal) was then selected, within which one district was randomly chosen (uMkanyakude district). 
The total number of farmers who are beneficiaries to the loan schemes in this district were 
identified using Mafisa internal records. The sample size was hence determined using Raosoft 
online sample calculator backed up by Israel (1992)’s formulas and proposals for sample size 
determination. Figure 3.1 is a screenshot of the online sample calculator which suggests a sample 
of 169 while Israel (1992: 3) suggests a sample of 172 at the 5% significance level. The selected 
sample size was hence the higher of the two (172 farmers) equally represented in the two districts. 
3.3 Analytical framework 
Quantitative research analysis techniques were used in this study. Descriptive statistics (mean, 
mode, median and standard deviation) were useful in the comparisons of central tendency and 
dispersion in the datasets for example the modal age group. The main form of statistical 
inferencing was logistic regression modelling following similar applications by Roslan and Karim 
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(2009) and Mokhtar (2011). Logistic regression was used in the determination of the strength of 
impact each factor has on the level of repayment of loans in the selected districts of KwaZulu-
Natal province.  
3.3.1 Regression equation and estimation techniques 
Based on the framework above, the study employs the multiple regression model to examine the 
effect of borrower characteristics developed such that: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝜀 
 
Where 
𝑦 = The loan repayment status  
𝑋1 = Age of borrower  
𝑋2 = Gender of borrower  
𝑋3 = Level of education of borrower  
𝑋4 = Borrower’s loan cycle  
𝑋5 = Size of land of borrower 
 𝛼 = The constant 
𝜀 = The error term 
𝛽1−𝛽5 = The coefficients/strength of impact of factor  𝑋1−𝑋5 
 
3.3.1 Estimation techniques 
Given a loan repayment model equation 3.2 below provided by Mokhtar (2011:57): Loan 
repayment status = f (socio economic factors, business factors, loan factors (3.2) 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑗) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑧𝑖
=
1
1+𝑒
−(𝛼+∑ 𝑗𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗+𝜀𝑖)
.………………………..(3.3) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 becomes 1 if the borrower is failing to repay the loan or 0 if the borrower is/has 
successfully serviced the loan and 
𝑃𝑖 measures the probability of loan default. This means the higher its value, the more likely it is 
that the advanced loan will default (Mokhtar, 2011:58). 
Summarising the regression equation produces: 
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𝑍𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑𝑗𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑍𝑖 = The probability of loan repayment 
𝛼 and 𝐵𝑗 = The constant and parameter respectively 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = The factors influencing loan repayment and  
𝜀𝑖 = The error term of the equation 
 
Using equation 3.3 (the cumulative logistic distribution function), we can deduce the probability 
of a borrower having no repayment problem as (1 − 𝑃𝑖) such that: 
(1 − 𝑃𝑖) = 
1
1+𝑒𝑍𝑖
  ………………………………………… (3.4) 
This means the chances of not having a repayment problem can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑖
1+𝑃𝑖
=
1+𝑒𝑍𝑖
1+𝑒−𝑍𝑖
= 𝑒𝑍𝑖…………………………………………... (3.5) 
This can be further expressed by taking natural logarithms to produce: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑃𝑖
1+𝑃𝑖
) =  𝛼 + ∑𝑗𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖 ………………………………… (3.6) 
In this equation, 𝑍𝑖 represents the odds ratio of a borrower having a repayment problem. 
 
While quoting Maddala (1983), Mokhtar (2011:59) noted that the model presented above is a 
binary choice model which makes the use of ordinary least squares estimation none appropriate. 
A maximum likelihood technique is hence adopted in the logistic regression equation to obtain 
the best estimates. This function is given in equation 3.7. 
 
𝐿 = ∏ 𝑃𝑖
𝑌𝑖=1
∏(1 − 𝑃𝑖)
𝑌𝑖=0
 
 
Using a deduction by Greene (1997) the function above can be used to deduce the probability of 
having a repayment problem as follows: 
𝑃𝑖 = (𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑗) =
𝑒𝑧𝑖
1 + 𝑒𝑧𝑖
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3.4 Definition of variables 
In this model, the two variables were separated into independent and dependent. The dependent 
variable was noted as “loan repayment status (whether the loan has been repaid or not at the time 
of the study. This was coded as dichotomous with ‘0’ representing a repaid loan and ‘1’ 
representing an unpaid one)” while independent variables were the factors under investigation. 
Based on literature review, the following factors were identified as independent variables: 
3.4.1 Age of the farmer 
This variable is a continuous variable which is will be measured in years. The hypothesis for this 
variable is that it should be positively related to the farmer’s loan repayment.  This is because of 
the fact that as the farmer gets older, he gets experience and knowledge in the use of credit which 
might help to accumulate wealth over time. This can enable the borrower to repay the debt in a 
shorter time than young borrowers could. Isitor, Otunaiya and Fabiyi (2016) and Nam and Duy 
(2016) found a positive relationship between loan repayment and age of the borrower. However, 
Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008), Wamalwa (2016) and Kiliswa and Bayat (2014) reported a 
negative relationship between loan repayment and age. 
3.4.2 Gender of the farmer  
This is a dummy variable and the farmers were categorised as either male or female. The 
hypothesis for this variable is that being a females is positively related to the farmer’s loan 
repayment. According to Roslan and Karim (2009) “lending to women can lead to their economic 
empowerment and inculcate in them a culture of hard work and financial discipline which can 
lead to high loan repayment rates.” This view is also supported by Nanayakkara & Stewart (2015) 
who argued that “there is strong evidence in the literature that repayments by female borrowers 
are better than those by males in micro finance lending.” 
Roslan and Karim (2009) and Sharma and Zeller (1997) found that the gender of the borrower 
influenced the probability of loan repayment. Other studies that support this are Oildale and Ward, 
(2016) and Nam and Duy (2016). On the other hand, Reta (2011) found that women have better 
repayment records only when they were members of a group. Tang (2002) found that women 
were worse in loan repayment than men. Finally, Godquin (2004) found that gender did not 
influence loan repayment. 
3.4.3. Educational level of the farmer 
This is a dummy variable and farmers were grouped according to whether they had matric or 
obtained post-matric qualification. Babatunde, Omotesho, and Sholotan (2007) and Hundie and 
Belay (2005) argued that education will have the impact of reducing default. The hypothesis is 
that the education level of the farmer has a positive relationship with loan repayment because of 
the following reasons (Selassie, 2008). Firstly, education improves the farmer’s ability to obtain, 
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process and use information. Farmers with more education may seek information on prices more 
than the those with less education and, as a result, may get better prices which will result in more 
income. Secondly, educated farmers are expected to have more exposure to the external 
environment and accumulated knowledge through formal training, which may lead to better 
decision making  
3.4.4. Loan amount  
This variable is a continuous variable which will be measured in Rands. The hypothesis for this 
variable is that it should be positively related to the farmer’s loan repayment. According to 
Selassie (2008) it is believed that when the loan amount is enough to fulfil the demand of the 
farmer, farmers will be in a position where they can apply the recommended rate of farm input. 
The expectation is that farmers who receive the amount that they demand will be able to produce 
enough products which will enable them to produce more products, which in turn, will also 
increase their sales. This will therefore increase their income, which will lead them to repay their 
loan on time. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on loan repayment. 
3.4.5. Loan cycle 
This variable is a continuous variable and refers to the number of times that the borrower applies 
for a loan from the lender (Nanayakkara & Stewart, 2015). The hypothesis for this variable is that 
it should be positively related to the farmer’s loan repayment. Limsombunchai et al (2005) argued 
that the relationship of a bank with the client increases with the loan cycle and this leads to 
reducing information asymmetry problems and results in improved repayment of loans. On the 
other hand, Paxton et al (2000) found that the loan cycle had a negative effect on group loan 
repayment. This is because loan officers and borrowers may take it easy when they get to know 
each other and become less cautious which may result in low repayment. 
3.4.6.  Size of the land. 
This is a continuous variable which is measured in hectares (ha). The hypothesis for this variable 
is that it should be positively related to the farmer’s loan repayment. It is expected that a farmer 
with more hectares of land will repay the loan better than the farmer with fewer hectares. This is 
because a large farm size will yield a higher production and a higher income and thus enable the 
farmer to repay the loan (Selassie: 2008)  
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Table 3: summary of definition of variables and measurements. 
Variable Measurement Scale 
Loan repayment status 1- default, 0-not in default Nominal 
Gender 1-Female, 0-Male Nominal 
Age Age of the borrowers in years. Ratio 
Educational level 1- up to matric, 0-beyond matric Nominal 
Loan amount Amount of loan Ratio 
Loan cycle Number of loans previously granted. Ratio 
Size of land Number of hectares Ratio 
3.5.    The research process 
This study involves an investigation of six factors that  influence the repayment behaviour using 
a sample of 191 of MAFISA funded farmers in uMkanyakude, KwaZulu-Natal province, South 
Africa. To achieve the research objectives,  raw data will be  obtained from Peulwana 
Agricultural Financial Services.This data will cover age, gender, level of education, amount 
borrowed, loan cycle, size of land and repayment status (as at the time of the data collection 
exercise). Secondary data is preferred because it will reduce costs and time of conducting the 
research. 
Raw data was  obtained  in the form of a Microsoft excel spreadsheet which had to be exported 
to SPSS version 25 software for analysis. In SPSS, data was cleaned by removing outliers, 
missing values and any rudimentary capturing errors identified. This study sought to use not 
only one single statistical inferencing technique, but two techniques whose results would be 
triangulated. Hence, chi-square analysis was conducted on each of the variables to determine 
individual impact on repayment behaviour of borrowers. All results from chi-square test were 
presented, analysed and interpreted in relation to previous empirical findings. The main 
analytical tool was the multiple logistic regression model in which all variables were put 
together simultaneously to determine individual and joint impacts using the equation presented 
under section 3.3.1. The logistic regression model included the calculation of beta coefficients 
for each variable, the odds ratio and the assumptions testing.  
  
25 
 
 
3.6  Chapter summary 
This chapter presented an outline of the research methods employed in this study, together with 
the population characteristics and sampling methods used. Following previous literature relating 
to the assessment of factors influencing loan default, this study employed a quantitative research 
approach in which a multiple logistic regression model was constructed. The model used 1 
dependent variable (loan repayment status) and 7 independent variables (see Table 3) to 
determine how factors independently affect the loan repayment behaviour of small-scale 
farmers in the Ilembe and Umkhanyekude districts in KwaZulu-Natal. 
26 
 
CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research findings. Firstly, descriptive statistics on the sample will be 
presented. This will be followed by the chi square test and the validity analysis. Lastly the logit 
regression analysis will be discussed.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 shows how borrowers differ in their characteristics as seen by differences in age, gender, 
educational level, amount borrowed, loan cycle and hectares. The age of the borrowers ranges 
between 32 and 89 years with a standard deviation of 12 years. On the other hand, borrowers have 
land sizes that range from two to 497 hectares, with a standard deviation of 91 hectares. The loan 
amount ranges from R10 000 to a maximum of R1 731 694.The loan cycle ranges from a 
minimum of one and a maximum of eight cycles. The land size ranges from two ha to a maximum 
of 497 ha with a mean of 51 ha and a standard deviation of 91 ha.  
Table 4 standard deviation and mean of variables 
Variable Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Age 32 89 54 12 
Loan amount 10 000 1 731 694 371 214 992 517 
Loan cycle 1 8 1.72 1.56 
Land size 2 ha 497 ha 51 ha 91 ha 
Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
From table 5 the following age groups make up the majority of the farmers in Umkanyakude: 30 
– 39 (29%), 40 – 49 (29%), 50 – 59 (27%). These age groups make up 77% of the farmers in the 
area (77%). The 60 – 89 age groups make up only 23 % of the farmers. Most of the farmers in the 
area are relatively young. 
On gender, 66% of the farmers are male and 34% are female, which shows that the majority of 
farmers in the area are male. Regarding education, 45% do not have matric, 39.3 % have matric 
and 15.7% have done tertiary studies. This shows that only a few farmers have done tertiary 
studies in the area. The majority of the farmers do not have matric (45%) followed by those who 
have matric (39%). Repayment status indicates that 55% are not in default, however, 45% of the 
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farmers are in default. The majority of the farmers farm sugar cane (90.6%) followed by 
vegetables (5.2%), grains (2.6%) and poultry (1.6%). 
Table 5 Demographic characteristics of the farmers  
Variable  No of participants Percentage 
Age  
30-39 years 55 29% 
40-49 years 40 21% 
50-59 years 46 15% 
60-69 years 29 27% 
70 and above 15 8% 
   
Gender 
Male  126 66% 
Female 65 34% 
Education level 
Up to matric 86 75.9% 
Beyond matric 75 24.1% 
   
Repayment status 
Not in default 105 55% 
In default 86 45% 
Sector of farming 
Vegetables  10 5.2% 
Grains 5 2.6% 
Poultry 3 1.6% 
Sugar cane 173 90.6% 
 Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
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4.3 Demographics and Default Status 
The section tests relationships between farmer characteristics and default status. The analysis 
below shows how each individual predictor contributes to the dependent variable using a chi-
square test of independence. The chi square was performed at the 5% significant level. 
4.3.1 Age and default status 
Results seem to suggest that younger borrowers have on average a lower repayment rate. The p 
value (0.241) indicates that there is no significant difference in the default status of farmers across 
different age groupings. 
Table 6: age and Default status 
Age group Percentage of 
defaulters  
Percentage not 
defaulted 
p value 
30-39 years 61.5% 38.5%  
 
   
 0.241; 5d.f. 
   
40-49 years 57% 43% 
50-59 years 61% 39% 
60-69 years 61% 39% 
70-79 years 57% 43% 
80-89 years 0% 100% 
Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
4.3.3 Gender and default status 
Table 7 shows that 54.8% of males are in default and 45.2% are not in default. On the other hand, 
55.4% of females are in default and 44.6% are not in default. The differences shown by a p value 
of 0.935 are insignificant between males and females. This suggests there is no significant 
difference in the default status of both men and women.  
Table 7: gender and default status 
Gender  Percentage 
of defaulters 
Percentage 
not defaulted 
 P value 
Males 54.8% 45.2%   
0.935; 1d.f. Females 55.4% 44.6%  
 Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
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4.4.4 Educational level and default status 
Table 8 shows that 46.5% of the farmers who do not have matric defaulted while 53.5% did not 
default. For those with matric, 64% defaulted and 36% did not default. Of those with tertiary 
studies, 67% defaulted and 33% did not default. The p-value of 0.086 indicates that educational 
level is not significant in influencing loan repayment. Using absolute figures seems to suggest 
that farmers who are educated beyond matric are more likely to default on their loans than those 
who are educated up to matric. Chi square results however fail to reject the null hypothesis with 
95% confidence; and suggest that there are statistically insignificant differences in repayment 
behaviours among different educational levels. 
Table 8: Educational level and default status 
Educational level Percentage of 
defaulters  
Percentage not 
defaulted 
P value 
Up to matric 46.5% 53.5%  
 
0.105; 2d.f. 
Beyond Matric 64% 36% 
    
 Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
4.4.5 Loan Cycle and default status 
Empirical studies have suggested that repayment behaviour is often influenced by the length of 
time a borrower has been in the system (borrowers’ experience). On one hand, it is possible that 
a farmer borrowing for the second or third time would have become more knowledgeable about 
the system and consequences of defaulting such that he/she is likely the to repay without default. 
On the other hand, first time borrowers may seek to build favourable credit records by having 
excellent repayment records on their first loans and then begin to default later on. 
Table 9 indicates that 44% of first-time borrowers defaulted and 56% did not default. For those 
farmers with a second and above cycles 85% defaulted and 15% did not default. Based on the p 
value (0.001), we can therefore reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the borrower’s loan 
cycle has implications for their likelihood to default.  
Table 9: loan cycle and Default status 
Loan cycle Percentage 
of 
defaulters  
Percentage 
not 
defaulted 
P value 
First time 44% 56%  
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Second & above times 85% 15% 0.001; 1d.f. 
Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
4.4.6 Loan amount and default status 
Loan amount is significant in influencing loan repayment. As the loan amount increases the 
repayment rate decreases. (see table 10). The p value of 0.002 shows that loan amount is 
significant in influencing loan repayment.  
Table 10: Loan amount and Default status 
Loan amount Percentage of 
defaulters  
Percentage 
not defaulted 
P value 
R10 001 – 40 000 45.5% 54.5%  
 
0.002; 3d.f. 
R40 001 – 100 000 42% 58% 
R100 001 – 500 000 72% 28% 
R500 001 & Above 74% 26% 
Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
4.4.7 Land size and default status 
Table 11 indicate that land size has a negative significant influence on loan repayment (p value is 
0.001). As the loan size increases the percentage of repayment reduces.  
Table 11: land size and default status  
Size of land Percentage of defaulted  Percentage not 
defaulted 
P value 
2 – 25 Hectares 40.5% 59.5%  
 
0.001; 2d.f. 
26 – 100 Hectares 89% 11% 
Above 100 Hectares  93.5% 6.5% 
Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
4.4 Regression Results 
The estimated coefficients and odds ratio for the explanatory factors for loan default are presented 
in Table 12. Of the six variables tested on their influence on loan repayment performance of 
smallholder farmers in umKanyakude district three were found to be statistically significant. 
Overall, the model was successful in predicting factors that contributed to 71.5% of the 
microcredit loan repayment problem. In addition, the Nagelkerke R squared of 0,499 indicates 
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that the model has predictive power. Finally, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test of 0,847 shows a good 
fit. 
The coefficient of age is positive, which consistent with the studies by Isitor et al (2016) and Nam 
and Duy (2016). However, it failed the test of significance and consistent with the findings of 
Haile (2015) and Godquin (2004) who found that age was not significant in influencing loan 
repayment. 
Table 12: Logit estimates for factors influencing loan repayment behaviour 
Independent variable Estimated beta 
coefficient 
Odds ratio 
Age  0.018 1.019 
Gender  0.193 0.602 
Size of land  -0.013 0.987** 
Loan cycle  -0.518 0.596* 
Educational level  0.264 1.303 
Loan amount  1.243 3.467* 
Constant -1.584**  
Nagelkerke R Squared 0.499  
Hosmer & Lemeshow test 0.847  
Lo likelihood 168.124  
Degrees of freedom   
Total observations 191  
Prediction accuracy (%) 71.5%  
Notes: ** beta coefficients and odds are significant at the 1% level; * beta coefficients and odds 
are significant at the 5% level; Source: Researchers estimate from research data 
The coefficient of gender is not significantly related to the likelihood of loan default. This 
indicates that loan repayment is not gender sensitive. This is in line with Batt and Tang (2002) 
who also found that gender is not significant in influencing loan repayment. However, due to the 
general skewness of results with 66% of participant farmers being male, it is possible that with a 
more gender balanced sample, results could show significant differences.  
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The size of farmland is observed to be negative and significantly related to the likelihood of loan 
default. This indicates that large farmland decreases the likelihood of loan default. The estimated 
odds ratio of 0.987 indicates that the association of size of farmland and loan default is not very 
strong. A farmer with more hectares of land is expected to be better off with loan repayment 
because a bigger farm may provide higher production which will enable the farmer to repay the 
loan (Selassie) 2008. This is in line with Selassie (2008) and Baklouti (2013) who find land size 
has a positive significant impact on loan repayment. However, this may not always be true in all 
circumstances since greater land size without farm efficiency may lead to even less output than 
smaller, easy to manage farms. 
 
The loan cycle is negative and significantly related to the likelihood of loan default. This indicates 
that a large loan cycle decreases the likelihood of loan default. The estimated odds ratio of 0.596 
indicates that the association of loan size and loan default is not very strong. A farmer with a 
higher loan cycle is expected to be better at loan repayment. This finding is in support of Kuhn 
and Darroch (1999) Nanayakkara and Steward (2015) and Onyeagocha and Chidebula (2012) 
who find a significant positive relationship between loan repayment and loan cycle. 
Limsombuchai et al (2005) in Nanayakkara (2015) argued that the relationship of a bank with the 
client improves with the loan cycle and this reduces information asymmetry problem leading to 
improved repayment.   
Education is not significant in influencing loan repayment. These results do not support studies 
done by Isitor et al (2016), Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008), Wamalwa (2016), Kiliswa and Bayat 
(2014) and Bat and Tang (2002). Such differences may relate to the skewed nature of the sample 
in this study where 76% were educated up to matric and 24% are educated beyond matric. Skewed 
samples may distort results due to the limited number of observations on one side.  However, the 
findings are supported by Mokhtar (2011) who also found that education is not significant in 
influencing loan repayment. Rather, farmers’ passion and experience in farming influence their 
productivity and overall ability to repay. Despite the disagreement of findings between this study 
and previous studies, results met the requirements of a chi square test and logistic regression since 
the minimum number of observations in each category were met.  
 
Loan amount is positive and is significantly related to the likelihood of loan default. This indicates 
that a large loan amount increases the likelihood of loan default. The estimated odds ratio of 3.47 
indicates that the association of loan size and loan default is very strong. A farmer with a large 
loan size is expected to find difficulty in loan repayment. This is not supported by Roslan and 
Karim (2009), Baklouti (2013) and Mokhtar (2011) who both found a positive significant 
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relationship between loan amount and loan repayment. The reason for this may be that as the loan 
size increases the possibility of moral hazard increases and thus the increase in loan default. 
4.5. Chapter summary 
This chapter concentrated on presenting results collected, analysing them and offering discussions 
in relation to literature. It begins by presenting the demographic profile of respondents in terms 
of their gender, age and educational level. This is followed by a discussion of the influence of 
each of the six factors on repayment behaviour using a chi square test of independence. The main 
model of the study is finally presented in section 4.4 together with the model-fit and predictive 
capacity tests. Overall, it was established that three out of six factors namely loan amount, size of 
land and borrowers’ loan cycle affect repayment behaviour while the other three (gender, age and 
educational level of farmers) were found to insignificantly affect repayment behaviour. 
Discussion of findings showed that findings of this study are corroborated by some previous 
studies while there are disagreements with others. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY , CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will cover a summary of the study, policy recommendations and possible areas of 
future research. Section 5.2 will provide the objective of the study as well as the major findings 
from the study. Section 5.3 will cover policy recommendations and section 5.4 will conclude 
with avenues for future research.  
 
5.2 Summary of the study 
A review of empirical studies focused mainly on establishing the theoretical framework within 
which the study is based and reviewing the factors influencing loan repayment behaviour of 
different borrowers. It was discovered that some empirical studies emphasize qualitative reasons 
which are hard to measure directly as among the prominent factors affecting repayment. One such 
a study is Norell (2001) who maintains that repayment is affected by lenders’ own willingness to 
repay; the rising of unforeseen circumstances; diversion of funds from the initial purpose and 
favouritism/nepotism in loan issue. While difficult to quantify, there is general agreement in 
literature that such factors exist especially among government funded loan programmes which 
seek to uplift rural/small scale farmers; such as by Godquin (2004) who corroborates the study by 
Norell (2001).  
 
Other studies emphasise the impact of quantitative factors on the repayment behaviour by 
borrowers. Studies such as Nanayakkara and Stewart (2015) and Roslan and Karim (2009) stress 
the relationship between borrower characteristics (such as age, gender and educational level), loan 
characteristics (such as the amount, term and interest rate) and institutional characteristics (such 
as the capacity to monitor and follow up on delinquent loans) as key factors impacting repayment. 
These studies suggest that the ability of a borrower to repay is not a simple question of one or two 
factors but is rather an interaction of related personal, loan and institutional factors. Further 
studies by Brehanu and Fufa (2008) and later by Reta (2011) also underline how the socio-
economic environment within which the loan was issued can determine whether a borrowed 
amount will be repaid or not. Overall, most studies conducted in sub-Saharan Africa are in general 
conformity when it comes to the factors influencing borrowers’ repayment ability. Studies which 
include Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008) (Nigeria), Wamalwa (2016) (Kenya) and Oladele and 
Ward (2016) (South Africa) are all in general conformity. 
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Mafisa was established in 2005 by the South African government to finance smallholder farmers. 
The scheme is a revolving fund and if repayments are low it implies that other farmers will not 
be able to get loans in the future. Low repayments may also lead to the closure of the scheme as 
funds can dry up. If that happens, government will no longer be able to assist smallholder farmers 
with credit for production inputs and this will hamper its initiative to create jobs, revitalise rural 
areas and provide food security. On the other hand, smallholder farmers and intermediaries may 
lose their source of livelihoods. 
The objective of this research was to determine factors that govern loan repayment for Mafisa 
funded farmers in Umkanyakude district, KZN. Data was collected from 191 selected loans 
granted by PAFS in Umkanyakude district. The study used secondary data obtained from PAFS. 
The sample size was determined using Raosoft online sample calculator. Logit model was used 
to analyse the data and predict the chances of success or failure regarding loan repayments.  The 
study found that age, gender and education were not significant in determining loan repayment. 
These findings are corroborated by studies such as Isitor et al. (2016), Oladeebo and Oladeebo 
(2008), Wamalwa (2016) and Kiliswa and Bayat (2014). The findings however disagree with Bat 
and Tang (2002).  On the other hand, land size, loan amount and loan cycle were significant in 
influencing loan repayment with a prediction accuracy of 71.5%. the significant factors all 
conform with previous findings such as Darroch (1999) Nanayakkara and Steward (2015) and 
Onyeagocha and Chidebula (2012). These studies indicate that (i) the larger the loan amount, the 
higher the chances of default; (ii) the larger the land size which the borrowed amount will be used 
for, the higher the chances of repayment and (iii) the more frequent a farmer borrows (more and 
more loan cycles), the more likely he/she is to repay the loan. Lastly, an analysis of the Nagelkerke 
R Squared and Hosmer & Lemeshow test showed that the model was sound and had high 
predictive power.   
5.3 Policy recommendations 
The results of the empirical analysis have three main policy implications for the government and 
the microfinance institutions. Firstly, government should assist smallholder farmers to obtain 
more hectares of land so that they can plant more crops and increase their sales. This will enable 
them to improve their repayment rate. This is based on the finding that farmers with large land 
sizes have better repayment records than those with smaller land sizes.   
Secondly, microfinance institutions should initially provide farmers with smaller loan amounts as 
it leads to good repayment. This will help to improve the scheme’s loan book. This 
recommendation is supported by the finding that farmers with a small loan amount repay their 
loans better than those farmers with large loan amounts. 
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Thirdly, microfinance institutions should provide more loans to lenders on a second or more loan 
cycle as this leads to good repayment. This may lead to an improved loan book and the 
sustainability of the microfinance institutions. This recommendation is supported by the finding 
that farmers with a second or more loan cycle have a better repayment record than those farmers 
with only one loan cycle. 
5.4 Avenues for future research 
Future research may include other district municipalities and other variables (that were not 
included in this study due to time and cost constraints). The variables are family size; amount of 
credit borrowed from other sources; off-farm and non-farm income; natural calamities e.g. 
drought; access to training; appropriateness of the repayment period; frequency of capital and 
interest repayments; time to approve and disburse the loan; amount approved compared to amount 
applied; and, visiting frequency by loan officers. Other factors that may affect loan repayment are 
availability of transport, distance to the MFI as well as the attitude of the borrower regarding loan 
repayment. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure 1: Proposed sample size with a population of 300 farmers 
 
Source: Raosoft inc [2004] 
 
 
